This thesis has tried to study about electronic voting system from a public law perspective based on the situation that electronic means are utilized even in elections that require acquiring credibility and securing safety to the people and in voting, which is the method to participate in elections by the development of IT technology. Furthermore it has been implemented in 35 nations around the world along with technical and systemetical improvements. However, securing fairness carries weight as electronic voting system has many problems to be solved by public law following each area or methods of voting. For Public Office Elections such as for Presidential Voting, Assembly Election, Local Government Voting, and Voting for superintendent of education, there were technical and institutional efforts to implement electronic voting since early 2000s, however, due to stability and credibility issues, even now in 2011, it hasn`t been implemented yet. In the case of 1st stage electronic voting utilizing optical scan or touch-screens on the polling station, the cost of election administration is reduced and the time spent on counting the votes is shortened while also increasing the participation of foreigners and the disabled. As we move further on to the 3rd stage electronic voting which utilizes internet the improvement rate of voter turnout and enhancement rate of voting convenience increases. However, in order to implement electronic voting to Public Office Elections, the most important task to deal with is to secure the public credibility while not harming the principles of elections. To countermeasure the possibilities of system crashes in the 1st stage PSEV electronic voting system, we can make additional installment of electronic voting equipment compulsory, implement preliminary verification, prepare controlled program facilities, and employ system maintenance crew. For safe transfer of the election results, we utilize the current level of police force for security procedures and have observers from each political party to keep a close eye on. Moreover, we can have the election results saved in and out of the voting equipment or have it printed out just in case. On the other hand, when there happens to be intentional losses or swaps of election results, we may arrange a severe penalty rule. For the verification procedure of the election results, we can keep the ballots printed out separately or utilize an Election Audit Trail as a technical verification method to aid accuracy in the tallying and recounting process. Although there may be some people who will not be used to the voting equipment because of the touch-screen, however, this can be overcome by manufacturing touch-screens specifically made for the old and the infirm, the disabled, and foreigners, or through education and advertisement. For those who are still blockaded from voting, we can carry out the pre-existing paper ballots along with electronic voting or we can consider utilizing proxy votes by having vote assistants like Japan. The initial installation costs are quite large, however, as the maintenance costs reduce significantly, as long as there are at least 30 or more polls, it is cost-effective and we can even aim for profits by exporting the electronic vote technology to abroad. If we only make use of the united electoral register, we would have to protect personal information through Private Information Protection Procedures and Encryption Protocols and also strengthen punishment rules in provision for exposure of the electoral register. For the 2nd stage KIOSK method, utilizing passwords, cookies, electronic signatures, introducing new electronic identification systems, and physical-recognition such as fingerprints have been discussed about to secure credibility of the identification process, however, as electronic IDs or physical-recognition methods have concerns of privacy violation, technologically cookies or electronic signatures are the most valid methods. But, these methods also have limitations due to the issue of intentional hacking and that it isn`t completely free from exposure of private information. In order to prevent double votes, we would have to create a network that connects the electoral register to the voting equipment to check for duplicate votes. To safely transfer the election result data, we could design the system that the central computer will separate the voter and the voting result and save the voting result only, or vote, certify, and tally the votes under an encrypted protocol to take care of the security issue and confidentiality issue by encrypting all data transfers. Also, we would have to prepare guidelines for when the system crashes to immediately deal with the error or have professional individuals to be stationed nearby. For the 3rd stage Voting via internet, we would have to first of all install a digital firewall to protect against invasions of hackers and viruses to secure network safety and create guidelines to countermeasure errors that may occur during the voting process. Also, penalties against electoral register or the election results exposure should be tightened up. To protect the secrecy of the vote, clearing links between the voter and the vote, encrypting the vote although the link between the voter and the vote remains, or having multiple people to be involved when counting the votes are being considered. To deal with the problem of the information-gap between people, simplifying the voting method, making internet access free for the election day, and having polling stations are being considered. The principles of direct election, free election, and secret voting are hard to be amended technologically when they are violated; it should be overcome by social confidence or strengthening punishment and management by bringing up the type of punishment to the courts and advertising so. This is widely in use abroad and we should see it as a value that needs to be overcome with trust just like the judicial precedent about voting by mail and on-ship voting stipulated on the Public Official Election Act for the expansion of the right to vote. Finally, to verify the election results, we could choose to stress the encryption voting system and trace votes by making public the encryption process, however, as it still has the dangers of exposure, we could consider granting the responsibility of confidentiality to the data processing manager and strengthening the punishment against violation of the responsibility. For the range of each areas, we should implement electronic voting in elections in which the range of voters is relatively narrow and the results have relatively small influence, such as in resident voting and regional elections, and expand the range gradually. However for overseas voting and on-ship voting, as the voters are in a difficult situation to vote and as the range of voters isn`t larger than the general public, we could implement the electronic voting system beforehand to increase the convenience of voting first, then expand the range. Also, the electronic voting system is heavily influenced by technological advance in aspects such as utilization of the united electoral register, identity confirmation of the voter, and securing safety in internet voting. Therefore, we should consistently amend the law and the system related to electronic voting in response to the technological and systematical enhancements in the future.