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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
Hongjung Shin (Seoul National University) Seong-ho Sheen (Seoul National University)
저널정보
한국국제정치학회 KJIS The Korean Journal of International Studies The Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.23 No.1
발행연도
2025.4
수록면
61 - 98 (38page)

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China has strengthened its assured nuclear retaliation capability, especially its sea-based nuclear force, strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs). Many previous studies have analyzed China's nuclear strategy based on minimum deterrence theory or nuclear posture ‘Optimization’ theory. However, as China emerges as a global power, the build-up of its nuclear arsenal requires a new approach other than the nuclear posture ‘Optimization’ theory, which assumes China is a regional power. On the other hand, given the changing international security environment surrounding China and the views of CMC leaders, it has become clear that China's nuclear posture cannot be explained through the civil-military relations variable either. The limitations of such conventional approaches highlights the need for a new analytical framework for China's evolving nuclear strategy in the 21st century. When faced with a choice between adopting ‘asymmetric escalation’ or ‘assured retaliation,’ the CMC leadership decided to maintain an assured retaliation posture. Despite the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional forces during the Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping eras, China maintained its nuclear posture. Thus, we suggest three new factors (independent variables) driving China's efforts to enhance its assured retaliation capability: ‘(1) Existential Threat Perception,’ ‘(2) Requirement for Second-Strike Survivability,’ and ‘(3) Leadership's Strategic Focus.’ By examining the evolution of China's nuclear strategy and capabilities from the Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping eras, this paper analyzes China's approach to assured retaliation through these independent variables, with a particular focus on the development of the PLAN's strategic nuclear submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

목차

INTRODUCTION
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA‘S NUCLEAR FORCE: FROM THE MAO ZEDONG TO HU JINTAO ERA
CHINA‘S NUCLEAR FORCE IN THE XI JINPING ERA
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES

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